Massachusetts Landowner Participation in Forest Management Programs for Carbon Sequestration: an Ordered Logit Analysis of Ratings Data by Dickinson, Brenton J
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
2010
Massachusetts Landowner Participation in Forest
Management Programs for Carbon Sequestration:
an Ordered Logit Analysis of Ratings Data
Brenton J. Dickinson
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 -
February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Dickinson, Brenton J., "Massachusetts Landowner Participation in Forest Management Programs for Carbon Sequestration: an
Ordered Logit Analysis of Ratings Data" (2010). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 440.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/440
 MASSACHUSETTS LANDOWNER PARTICIPATION IN  
FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS FOR CARBON SEQUESTRATION:  
AN ORDERED LOGIT ANALYSIS OF RATINGS DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented 
 
by 
 
Brenton J. Dickinson 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment  
Of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
May 2010 
 
Department of Resource Economics  
 MASSACHUSETTS LANDOWNER PARTICIPATION IN  
FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS FOR CARBON SEQUESTRATION:  
AN ORDERED LOGIT ANALYSIS OF RATINGS DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented 
 
by 
 
Brenton J. Dickinson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
___________________________________ 
Thomas H. Stevens, Chair 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Sylvia J. Brandt, Member 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Daniel A. Lass, Member 
 
 
___________________________________ 
John M. Spraggon, Member 
 
 
___________________________________ 
    Julie A. Caswell, Department Head 
    Resource Economics
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This study is based on a landowner mail survey conducted by the Family Forest 
Research Center. Thanks to all those who designed and executed the survey, in particular 
Lisa Romano. Thanks to Justin Renaud for inputting most of the 1,400 survey entries into 
a spreadsheet. Thanks to Marla Lindsay for her help navigating the carbon sequestration 
literature. 
I would not have been able to write this thesis without the initial request for my 
involvement in the study and subsequent unwavering technical and emotional support of 
Tom Stevens. Thanks to Dan Lass and Sylvia Brandt for their invaluable guidance with 
respect to the econometric theory used in this study. Thanks to John Spraggon for help 
with software issues.  
Finally, I owe much of the success of my education in general to the Resource 
Economics Department and all its staff and faculty. Without the unbelievable funding and 
teaching opportunities I’ve been privileged with, I would not have made it through these 
two years in the graduate program. Thanks in particular to Julie Caswell and Nathalie 
Lavoie for guidance through the program.
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
MASSACHUSETTS LANDOWNER PARTICIPATION IN  
FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS FOR CARBON SEQUESTRATION:  
AN ORDERED LOGIT ANALYSIS OF RATINGS DATA 
 
MAY 2010 
 
BRENTON J. DICKINSON, B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Thomas H. Stevens 
 
 
 
The Family Forest Research Center recently conducted a mail survey of about 
1,400 Massachusetts landowners. Respondents were given questions about themselves 
and their land and were then asked to rate three carbon sequestration programs in terms 
of their likelihood to participate. An ordered logit model is used to estimate probabilities 
that landowners would participate in various improved forest management programs. 
There are several estimation issues to consider with the ordered logit model. The relative 
merits of alternative models, including the multinomial and binomial logit, rank-ordered 
logit, binary logit and mixed ordered logit are discussed.  
Results of the ordered logit indicate that older males with less education and who 
own less than 100 acres are less likely to participate in an improved forest management 
program. All landowners are less likely to participate in a program that requires a 
management plan and that has a lengthy time commitment, low revenue stream and early 
withdrawal penalty. Policy implications and direction for future research are discussed.  
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ iii 
 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. iv 
 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... ix 
 
CHAPTER 
 
1.         INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL WARMING AND IMPROVED FOREST  
MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................. 1 
 
1.1 Background ................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Objectives ................................................................................................................... 3 
 
2.         POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND MARKETS: IFM OFFSET OVERVIEW ............ 5 
 
2.1 Cap and Trade Programs .......................................................................................... 5 
 
2.1.1 Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord ............................................... 6 
2.1.2 California Climate Action Reserve ......................................................... 6 
2.1.3 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ....................................................... 7 
2.1.4 Western Climate Initiative ....................................................................... 7 
2.1.5 Possible National Cap and Trade System .............................................. 7 
 
2.2 Voluntary Carbon Offset Markets ........................................................................... 9 
 
2.2.1 Chicago Climate Exchange ...................................................................... 9 
2.2.2 Over the Counter Markets ...................................................................... 13 
 
2.3 Chapter 61B .............................................................................................................. 15 
2.4 Summary ................................................................................................................... 16 
 
3.         HOW LIKELY ARE NIPF LANDOWNERS TO PARTICIPATE IN  
CARBON MARKETS? ................................................................................................ 18 
 
3.1 The Literature ........................................................................................................... 18 
3.2 A Massachusetts Landowner Survey .................................................................... 20 
3.3 Summary ................................................................................................................... 23 
 
4.         METHODOLOGY......................................................................................................... 24 
 
4.1 The Most Common Choice Models ...................................................................... 24 
vi 
4.1.1 Linear and Tobit ...................................................................................... 24 
4.1.2 The Multinomial Logit ........................................................................... 24 
4.1.3 The Binomial Logit ................................................................................. 26 
4.1.4 The Binary Logit ..................................................................................... 27 
 
4.2 The Ordered Logit : A Model Suited for Ratings Data ...................................... 27 
 
4.2.1 Model Setup ............................................................................................. 27 
4.2.2 How to Interpret an Ordered Logit Model ........................................... 29 
 
4.3 Possible Problems with the Standard Ordered Logit .......................................... 31 
 
4.3.1 Choice Task Complexity and Protest.................................................... 31 
4.3.2 Hypothetical Bias ............................................................................. 32 
4.3.3 The Proportional odds Assumption ....................................................... 35 
4.3.4 The Repeated Choice Problem: Correlated Error Structure .............. 35 
 
4.4 Possible Solution for the Proportional odds and Repeated Choice  
Problems: The Mixed Ordered Logit ........................................................................... 35 
 
4.5 Summary ................................................................................................................... 39 
 
5.         DATA ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................ 40 
 
5.1 Programs at a Glance............................................................................................... 40 
5.2 Individual Characteristics ....................................................................................... 43 
5.2 Estimation Problems: The Mixed Ordered Logit ................................................ 45 
5.3 Standard Ordered Logit Results ............................................................................. 45 
 
5.3.1 The Repeated Choice Problem .............................................................. 45 
5.3.2 The Proportional Odds Problem ............................................................ 45 
5.3.3 Indicators and Interactions: A Stepwise Procedure ............................ 46 
5.3.4 Regression Results .................................................................................. 47 
 
5.4 Binary Logit: A Comparison .................................................................................. 48 
5.5 Partial Effects ........................................................................................................... 51 
5.6 Summary ................................................................................................................... 55 
 
6.         POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE  
RESEARCH .................................................................................................................... 56 
 
6.1 Policy Implications .................................................................................................. 56 
 
6.1.1 Maximum Participation Versus Maximum Carbon Sequestration ... 56 
6.1.2 The Population of Interest ...................................................................... 58 
6.1.3 Subsidies ................................................................................................... 58 
vii 
 
6.2 Recommendations for Future Research ................................................................ 62 
 
6.2.1 Choice Elicitation Method: Ratings Versus Direct Choice ............... 62 
6.2.2 Better Capturing of Choice Task Complexity and Protest Issues ..... 64 
 
6.3 Summary ................................................................................................................... 64 
 
7.         CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 66 
 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................. 69 
 
A.         PROGRAMS FROM THE SURVEY ........................................................................ 70 
B.         EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES USED .............................................................. 71 
C.         CHOICE ELICITATION SECTION OF THE SURVEY ....................................... 72 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 74 
 
  
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table               Page 
1: Attributes and Levels for Each of the 12 Programs ...................................................... 21 
2: Explanation of Variables Used ..................................................................................... 22 
3: Summary Statistics on Ratings by Program ................................................................. 42 
4: Differences in Charactersitc Proportions Between All Receved Surveys and Only 
Surveys with Three Program Ratings ................................................................... 44 
5: Ordered Logit Results ................................................................................................... 47 
6: Binary Logit Results ..................................................................................................... 49 
7: Probabilities of Ratings by Program for Ordered and Binary Models ......................... 50 
8: Partial Effects on Probability of a 10 Rating Using Average Program  
Attributes and Modal Individual Characteristics .................................................. 51 
9: Partial Effects on Probability of a 10 Rating Using CCX-Like Attributes  
and Modal Individual Charactersitics ................................................................... 52 
10: Partial Effects on Probability of a 10 Rating Using Modal Characteristics  
of Respondents with 6-9 Ratings .......................................................................... 54 
11: Probabilities of 10 Ratings for Modal Respondents at Different Program  
Attributed Levels .................................................................................................. 59 
12: Probabilities of 10 Rating for Modal Respondents with 6-9 Ratings at  
Different Program Attribute Levels ...................................................................... 61 
  
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure               Page 
1: Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 1 Programs ............................................... 40 
2: Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 2 Programs ............................................... 41 
3: Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 3 Programs ............................................... 41 
4: Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 4 Programs ............................................... 42 
  
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL WARMING AND IMPROVED FOREST 
MANAGEMENT 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Global warming is already affecting weather and other elements of our planet’s 
ecosystem. Overwhelming scientific evidence indicates that the warming is largely 
human caused. Burning of fossil fuels, other industrial processes and deforestation have 
contributed to rising levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHGs), which trap solar 
energy in the earth’s atmosphere (Peschel, et al., 2007). According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the earth will experience regional warming, 
changes in precipitation, extreme weather, more drought, earlier snowmelts, rising sea 
levels, problems with water supply and other changes as a result of global warming over 
the next several decades. Even If GHG emissions were completely halted today, the earth 
would still warm for the next 100 years or so (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2007).  
In the northeast US the average temperature has risen by 0.45 degrees Fahrenheit 
per decade since 1970. Average annual precipitation in the northeast has seen a 0.4 inch 
per year increase. Scientists project that by 2050, northeast summers will be two degrees 
Fahrenheit warmer and winters four degrees warmer. More rain, heavier storms and even 
drought caused by shifting precipitation timing are expected (Perschel, et al., 2007). 
Many more effects have been documented both globally and locally, but will not be 
covered here. 
The solution to excessive GHGs lies not just in cutting back carbon emissions 
from industry. Carbon emitters can buy time to develop greener technologies by 
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offsetting emissions through the funding of emissions-reducing projects or carbon 
sequestering activities elsewhere. Carbon emitters can arrange to capture methane 
emitted from landfills and agriculture for use in energy production. Though carbon 
dioxide is still released, atmospheric effects are far less than if the methane were allowed 
to escape. Carbon emitters can also arrange to capture and recycle sulfur hexa-fluoride, a 
powerful greenhouse gas emitted from electrical transformers.  An end-use emissions 
reduction offset is making non-power generation sources of carbon dioxide more 
efficient, such as improving large buildings’ heating systems. Carbon emitters can even 
plant trees to sequester carbon (Farnsworth, 2007). Another type of forestry-based offset 
is improved forest management (IFM), which are explained below. The domain of this 
paper is limited to IFM offsets. These other offset types will not be discussed further.  
Forests naturally sequester carbon through the photosynthesis process. IFM 
techniques have been developed to help forests sequester carbon more efficiently. 
According to the US Forest Service, good forest management can double the quantity of 
carbon sequestered (American Forest Foundation, 2009).  
There are several distinct IFM techniques. The most basic type of IFM is the 
implementation of low-impact logging in conventionally logged forests. In contrast to 
conventional logging, low-impact logging involves more selectivity in harvesting trees. 
Canals are not used to export the logs because they remove peat, thereby increasing 
emissions of carbon dioxide. Skid trails are more carefully planned to reduce soil erosion. 
Another type of IFM consists of simply converting currently logged forests into protected 
forests. A third type involves allowing timber forests to grow longer before cutting. 
Finally, forests that are not currently logged can be actively managed to improve carbon 
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sequestration. The stocking of fast-growing trees in poorly stocked forests can increase 
sequestration. The density of trees in a forest can be increased. In some cases, 
fertilization and liming can greatly increase the carbon stock of  a forest (Voluntary 
Carbon Standard, 2007). 
IFM offsets are potentially a substantial source of net carbon emissions reduction. 
Ten percent of US carbon emissions are absorbed by America’s forests each year. 
Around 35 percent of all the forestland in the US is family owned (American Forest 
Foundation, 2009). US forest owners can play a significant role in climate change 
mitigation through IFM. 
There are several potential and actual opportunities for the US non-industrial 
private forest (NIPF) owner to implement IFM techniques on his or her land and sell the 
resulting carbon offsets.  These include several current domestic cap and trade programs 
including the California Climate Action Reserve, Western Climate Initiative, Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and a possible national cap and trade system currently moving 
through Congress. Opportunities also exist in the form of the voluntary Chicago Climate 
Exchange and over the counter offset markets.  
1.2 Objectives 
The purpose of this paper is to predict the probability that Massachusetts 
landowners will participate in various hypothetical offset programs. A landowner survey 
conducted by the Family Forest Research Center is used in conjunction with an ordered 
logit discrete choice model to that end. Within the analysis, marginal probabilities for 
individual characteristics and program attributes are also estimated. This information will 
be invaluable to the policy maker invested in designing an optimal IFM offset program.  
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A review of all relevant policies, programs and markets related to IFM offsets 
follows in chapter 2. The Kyoto Protocol, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Western 
Climate Initiative, California’s cap and trade program, a potential national cap and trade 
program in the House and Senate climate bills and voluntary carbon markets are covered 
therein. A literature review of studies investigating the likelihood of NIPF landowner 
participation in carbon offset programs as well as a description of the landowner survey 
used in this study follow in chapter 3. A consideration of several discrete choice model 
candidates for analysis of the survey data and a theoretical framework for the ordered and 
mixed ordered logistic models for use in the final analysis are presented in chapter 4. 
Ordered logit regression results as well as predicted and marginal probabilities of 
participation are discussed in chapter 5. In chapter 6, policy implications of these findings 
are summarized and directions for future research are suggested. Chapter 7 summarizes 
and concludes this paper. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND MARKETS: IFM OFFSET OVERVIEW 
There are markets for buying and selling the carbon sequestration services that 
IFM provides. Some of these markets are the result of cap and trade programs while other 
markets are strictly voluntary. There are several programs designed specifically to 
encourage participation of the American NIPF landowner. The purpose of this chapter is 
first to determine the offset markets and any other carbon sequestration programs that are 
relevant to the Massachusetts NIPF landowner. The other motivation is to establish a list 
of program or policy parameters that a prospective participant is likely to face.  
All markets and programs with potential and actual relevance to the 
Massachusetts NIPF landowner are detailed below. Cap and trade programs, voluntary 
offset markets and the Chapter 61B current tax use program are considered. A literature 
review of the topic of landowner participation in carbon sequestration programs follows. 
Finally, a summary of the relevant programs associated parameters of involvement is 
presented. 
2.1 Cap and Trade Programs 
A carbon cap and trade program consists of two parts. First, the government 
decides a cap – a maximum allowable quantity of emissions units. Second, carbon 
emitters included in the program are allowed to trade emissions unit permits. That way, 
an emitter who has a higher cost associated with reducing emissions can buy permits 
from an emitter with lower costs of emissions reduction. Some cap and trade programs 
also allow carbon emitters to count offsets – created through the funding of projects and 
activities that reduce atmospheric carbon – toward the emissions reduction target. 
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International and domestic cap and trade programs are described below in terms of their 
use or non-use of IFM offsets and their relevance to the NIPF landowner. 
2.1.1 Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement that sets binding carbon 
emissions reduction targets for 37 developed nations. The US has not signed on. 
Reduction targets average five percent lower than 1990 levels, to be achieved between 
2008 and 2012 (United Nations, 1998). The Protocol is a cap and trade program wherein 
countries and industries can sell carbon allowances if they surpass their target and buy 
allowances if they struggle to meet it. One of the flexibility mechanisms designed to 
make this process as cost-effective as possible is the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). The CDM allows an industrialized country trying to use emissions reductions 
from an approved green development project in a developing nation toward its own 
emissions target. The only forestry projects allowed are reforestation and afforestation 
(United Nations, 1998). The Kyoto Protocol therefore has no relevance to IFM projects at 
all. 
The Copenhagen Accord is a far less detailed international agreement on climate 
change. The Accord does not set any legally binding emissions reductions targets for any 
country. It is immaterial to IMF offset markets as well (Copenhagen, 2009).  
2.1.2 California Climate Action Reserve 
Several domestic cap and trade programs have been or are being established. 
California has a cap and trade program, the California Climate Action Reserve (CAR), 
that allows for limited IFM offsets. The California Air Resources Board recently 
developed protocols for trading IFM offsets as directed by SB 812. Currently California 
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has three such pilot projects in operation. They are large in scale and government 
administered (Nickerson, 2008). At present, the CAR program is not relevant to NIPF 
landowners. 
2.1.3 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
Ten northeast states have signed onto the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), a regional cap and trade program. The program is operational as of 2009. It aims 
to stabilize carbon emissions between 2009 and 2015 and to reduce emissions by 10 
percent by 2019. RGGI currently does not allow for IFM offsets. However, the Post 
Model Rule Action Plan leaves room for additional sources of offsets, including IFM, to 
become eligible later (Perschel, et al., 2007). RGGI is not currently relevant to the NIPF 
landowner 
2.1.4 Western Climate Initiative 
The Western Climate Initiative is another regional cap and trade system, 
developed in 2007. It involves California, Washington, Oregon, New Mexico, Arizona, 
Utah, Manitoba and British Columbia. The goal of the program is to reduce carbon 
emissions to 15 percent lower than 2005 levels by 2020 (Perschel, et al., 2007). 
Carbon offset rules are still being developed. It is known only that offsets will be 
limited to 49 percent of total emissions reduction targets. Whether or not IFM offsets will 
be allowed is unclear at this time (WCI Recommendations, 2010).  
2.1.5 Possible National Cap and Trade System 
In 2009, the U.S. House passed the Waxman-Markey bill, also called the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. The legislation outlines a national cap 
and trade system that includes liberal use of offsets. IFM is eligible for use in the offset 
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market, but regulations regarding specific programs are not explicit. Relevance to NIPF 
landowners is uncertain. The EPA, in cooperation with a specially assigned committee, 
will determine eligible offset programs over the two years following passage of a final 
bill (American Clean Energy and Security Act, 2009).  
The Senate is currently debating the Kerry-Boxer bill, officially known as the 
Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, which closely mirrors the House version 
(U.S. Climate Legislation, 2009). There are many reasons to expect IFM offsets to play a 
significant role in the final legislation. The US Environmental Protection Agency (2009) 
projects that 81 percent of domestic offsets for the beginning years of this cap and trade 
program will need to come from forestry offsets.  
A study by the Congressional Budget Office predicts that demand will outstrip 
supply of offsets in the early years of the cap and trade program. If that happens, offset 
prices will likely be high (Congressional Budget Office, 2009). The language of the two 
climate bills indicates that offsets already purchased voluntarily or as part of a regional 
cap and trade program will be eligible for use in the new cap and trade system. 
Consequently, demand for offsets from groups like New Forests – a company that 
evaluates and implements forest carbon offset projects – has risen dramatically (U.S. 
Climate Legislation, 2009).  
At present, this national cap and trade program does not represent an opportunity 
for the NIPF landowner to sell IFM offsets, but may soon. Both the House and Senate 
bills set aside two billion annual tons of carbon emissions reduction to come from offsets 
(one billion domestic and one billion international). IFM will likely be an acceptable 
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source of offsets. In that scenario, it is easy to imagine a role for the NIPF landowner 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2009). 
2.2 Voluntary Carbon Offset Markets 
Cap and trade programs can create offset markets driven by the need of carbon 
emitters to find cheaper ways to reduce net emissions. There are also voluntary carbon 
offset markets driven by the desire of anyone wanting to buy or sell carbon offsets 
created by various projects and activities. Buyers and sellers can be individual people or 
large firms. There are two voluntary markets in the U.S. These are described below in 
terms of their relevance to the NIPF landowner. 
2.2.1 Chicago Climate Exchange 
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is a rules-based voluntary carbon offset 
market. It allows and has specific protocols for IFM offsets. The CCX is currently 
developing a California Climate Exchange, a New York Climate Exchange and a 
Northeast Climate Exchange for trading offsets in regional cap and trade programs 
(Chicago Climate Exchange, 2007).  
Costs of getting certified and meeting other requirements are too high at the 
individual family forest scale for the NIPF landowner to sell IFM offsets on the CCX. 
There are several offset aggregation programs around the country designed to create the 
economies of scale necessary to sell on the CCX  by pooling the IFM offsets of NIPF 
landowners. These programs are jointly run by state government agencies and private 
forestry companies. The parameters of involvement in these programs are detailed below. 
An apparently successful example is a pilot program called the Michigan 
Working Forest Carbon Offset Program (MWFCOP). The non-profit Delta Institute 
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aggregates credits from many small landowners and trades with the CCX. Landowners 
are annually paid the net revenues from their credits after accounting for aggregation and 
trading fees. Fees include a $0.20/ton of carbon credits earned and a ten percent charge 
on gross carbon revenues (Delta Institute, 2009).  
In accordance with CCX protocol, landowners are not paid for 20 percent of 
estimated carbon sequestration as insurance against harvest or catastrophic loss. Each 
year, that 20 percent goes into a reserve pool. If by 2010 the reserve pool is positive, the 
landowner can sell the credits. If by that year the reserve pool is negative, the landowner 
is required to purchase credits to make up the difference. If the forest landowner does not 
comply with the prescribed sustainable forestry management plan, he or she must return 
the carbon credits earned during the project years, and may also be permanently banned 
from participation in the CCX. The landowner can cancel the contract if the Delta 
Institute agrees to it. For a fee, the Michigan DNR can provide landowners with technical 
assistance in assessing carbon stocks, etc (Delta Institute, 2009).  
To be eligible, a working forest must be actively managed and enrolled in a forest 
stewardship program through a prescribed list of organizations, including the Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative. In order to participate in the MWFCOP, the landowner must establish 
a baseline inventory of the carbon stock, report annual changes from harvesting or 
weather damage, be verified annually by a CCX-approved third party, and write a letter 
indicating commitment to an approved forest management plan (Delta Institute). 
Landowners recently enjoyed an $8 per acre return (Oregon Small Woodlands 
Association, 2009). 
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Inspired by the success of the Michigan pilot program, two other programs in that 
region have emerged. One is the Michigan Conservation and Climate initiative, and the 
other is the Illinois Conservation and Climate Initiative. The requirements for 
participation, fees and costs associated with these programs are identical to the Michigan 
pilot project (Michigan Conservation & Climate Initiative, 2010).  
A similar program is operating in the Western United States. Woodlands Carbon, 
a corporation formed in 2008 by the Oregon Small Woods Association (OSWA) and the 
American Forest Foundation (AFF), aggregates and trades offset credits from NIPF 
landowners on the CCX. Contracts with Woodlands Carbon last 15 years. As with the 
Michigan program, 20 percent of credits earned must be set aside as insurance. Up to an 
additional 10 percent may be deducted to account for error in sequestration estimation.  
Liability from catastrophic weather is limited to 20 percent of carbon credits; the 20 
percent can be sold at the end of a market period if it is not lost (Oregon Small 
Woodlands Association, 2009).  
Startup costs for a prospective participant include the cost of certifying the land, 
unless the landowner is already certified by an approved organization. Woodlands 
Carbon offers loans for certification costs, eliminating the need for out-of-pocket 
expenditure. The required OSWA membership costs $135 for owners of more than 70 
acres and $85 for owners of less than 70 acres. Woodlands Carbon charges a percentage 
of carbon revenues for aggregation and trading services. There are financial penalties for 
non-compliance with the contract. In accordance with CCX protocol, all forestland 
owned by an individual must be enrolled. Thus, a landowner cannot set aside some of his 
12 
land for timber and other land for carbon credits (Oregon Small Woodlands Association, 
2009).  
To be eligible, the land must meet certain productivity and inventory 
requirements. Any acreage is eligible, but plots of less than 100 acres are not likely to be 
profitable. One person needs to be authorized to make decisions regarding forest 
management. The forest owner needs to be enrolled in the American Tree Farm System 
and must maintain Tree Farm Certification for 15 years from the time the contract with 
Woodlands Carbon begins. The owner needs to be a member in good standing with 
OSWA for the 15 year contract. The owner must inventory carbon stocks in accordance 
with CCX protocol and present the data in the approved Woodlands Carbon format 
annually. Any timber sales contracts by the owner must include a stipulation maintaining 
ownership of the carbon stored in the timber. Audits are infrequent but may happen at 
any time (Oregon Small Woodlands Association, 2009). 
A Northeast pilot project is also under way. CarbonTree, LLC was formed by the 
Empire State Forest Products Association (ESFPA) and the American Forest Foundation 
to aggregate and trade sequestered carbon offsets on behalf of private Northeast forest 
landowners. The structure of the program is nearly identical to that administered by 
Woodlands Carbon. ESFPA membership is required. It costs $120 per year for owners of 
more than 500 acres and $60 per year for those owning less. Excluding certification and 
annual verification costs, CarbonTree charges 12 percent of all sales. The same eligibility 
requirements apply as with Woodlands Carbon (CarbonTree, 2009). 
In short, the parameters of participating in these aggregation programs are fairly 
consistent. A prospective participant must be willing to sign a 15 year contract and file a 
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management plan. The participant usually will face penalties for breaking the contract. If 
the Michigan pilot program is a good indicator, it is only worth participating for 
landowners with over 100 acres. Landowners can expect around $8 per acre per year.  
2.2.2 Over the Counter Markets 
While the CCX is a centralized, closely monitored rules-based market, over the 
counter (OTC) markets do not operate under any required set of protocols. OTC markets 
are not bound by any rules whatsoever. OTC market interactions can be as simple as a 
single project developer selling his offset credit to a single willing buyer or as 
complicated as an aggregator buying from many projects and selling wholesale to a 
retailer, who then sells the offsets to willing buyers (Hamilton, et al., 2008).  
To make trades more transparent and credible, most forestry offset sellers obtain 
certification through one of several common standards. The most popular standards used 
by offset suppliers in early 2008 were the Voluntary Carbon Standard, the Gold Standard, 
the VER+, and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standard. There are 
several purposes that a standard can serve: accounting standards, monitoring, verification 
and certification standards, and registration and enforcement systems. Some standards, 
known as full-fledged carbon offset standards, serve all of these functions. VCS, the Gold 
Standard, and the VER+ are full-fledged standards, while the CCB is a project design 
standard (Kolmuss, et al., 2008). The Gold Standard does not cover IFM projects, so is 
not described in detail here. As the CCB standard is not comprehensive, it is not covered 
here either. Below is a brief description of the requirements of the VCS and VER+ 
standards. 
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The VCS does cover IFM projects, provided that they are not earning some other 
type of environmental credit elsewhere. There are no restrictions on project size or 
location, though a “micro” project is defined as one that offsets under 5,000 tons of 
carbon per year. There are comprehensive additionality and baseline requirements. 
Projects are required to be above and beyond any regulation – they must be proven to be 
totally voluntary. The crediting period of VCS projects is 10 years. There is a registration 
fee for each Voluntary Carbon Unit (VCU) accredited of four euro cents. Additional 
account fees are set by the VCS approved registries (Kolmuss, et al., 2008).  
The VER+ standard also includes rules for IFM offset projects. There are no size 
restrictions on VER+ projects. Additionality and baseline methodologies are developed 
on a project by project basis. Verification and registration of projects is conducted by an 
accredited auditor and is based on validation reports of the project developer. Verification 
fees depend on the rates of VER+ approved auditors, but range between 5,000 and 15,000 
Euros. Registration fees range between 1,500 and 3,000 Euros (Kolmuss, et al., 2008).  
There are many opportunities for large carbon emitters (or anyone else) to offset 
their emissions using the voluntary market standards detailed above. There are equally 
many opportunities for large-scale retailing of carbon offsets through IFM projects. As 
with the CCX, the individual NIPF landowner cannot sell certified IFM offsets on OTC 
markets because of the high startup costs. There are offset aggregators for voluntary 
markets, including New Forests and Forecon. However, these aggregators are not geared 
toward the NIPF landowner. The voluntary market is irrelevant to the NIPF landowner at 
the present time. 
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2.3 Chapter 61B 
In Massachusetts, there are three current use tax programs. Landowners can enjoy 
reduced property taxes for restricting the use of the their land to a specific purpose. The 
Chapter 61B program in particular provides substantial tax incentives in return for 
providing wildlife habitat and local timber products. The program is covered here 
because it can be considered as a non-market carbon sequestration program that does not 
require participants to file a management plan, has a minimal time commitment, high 
revenue and a penalty for early withdrawal.  
To be eligible to participate, the landowner must have at least 5 acres, excluding 
residence and other buildings. Land use is restricted to either open space or recreation. 
Open space means land retained in a substantially natural, wild, or open condition; land 
retained in a landscaped or pasture condition; or managed forest under a state-approved 
forest management plan. Public access is not required for open space use. Recreation 
means land that is available for recreational purposes that do not harm the environment. 
Under the recreation category, the land must be accessible to the public or to members of 
a nonprofit organization. The landowner is permitted to charge an access fee. 
The landowner is not required to file a management plan with the state unless he 
or she plans to harvest timber. Harvesting timber on Chapter 61B land is allowed 
provided the landowner files an approved management plan. If the landowner changes 
use of the land within five years of enrolling in the program, there is an early withdrawal 
penalty consisting of back taxes. Should the landowner sell the property for a change in 
use within ten years of enrolling, the back tax penalty also applies. After those times, no 
early withdrawal penalties will be incurred.  
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If the landowner sells the property for residential, commercial, or industrial use 
while enrolled in Chapter 61B or within a year of leaving the program, the town has the 
right to match any offer for the land and purchase it. There is no fee charged to the 
landowner to enroll or to transfer land use to another Chapter 61 program. The value of 
the land is determined by its recreational use value. Non-eligible sections of the land are 
taxed at normal rates (Chapter 61B).  
2.4 Summary 
There are only a few opportunities for the NIPF landowner to sell IFM offsets. All 
of the cap and trade programs mentioned either do not allow IFM offsets or are not 
geared toward NIPF landowners. However, new climate legislation could change that if 
the Senate bill is passed. NIPF landowners may be able to sell IFM offsets in a national 
cap and trade system.  
Over the counter offset markets are also inaccessible to the NIPF landowner. The 
economy of scale is too small at the individual small landowner level. Startup costs and 
fees are too high for selling IFM offsets to be profitable. 
The only offset programs geared specifically toward the small forest owner 
consist of IFM offset aggregation for the CCX. These programs generally require 
participants to file a management plan, have a 15 year time commitment, $8 per acre 
annual revenue and an early withdrawal penalty. Only one of these programs – the New 
York based CarbonTree – is accessible to the Massachusetts NIPF landowner.  
There is also a land use tax program in Massachusetts that resembles a carbon 
sequestration incentive program. Though carbon sequestration is not the explicit goal of 
Chapter 61B, the program can be considered a relatively unrestrictive, high-revenue 
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incentive program for carbon sequestration. This program does not require participants to 
file a management plan unless the participant plans to harvest timber, has a minimal time 
commitment, and no early withdrawal penalty in most circumstances. The tax savings can 
be quite substantial, translating into a much higher revenue than the CCX-based 
programs.  
In the next chapter, the available literature about landowner participation in 
carbon sequestration programs is reviewed. A survey of Massachusetts landowners 
designed to assess likelihood of their participation in such programs is summarized.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HOW LIKELY ARE NIPF LANDOWNERS TO PARTICIPATE IN CARBON 
MARKETS? 
 
The literature regarding NIPF landowner participation in carbon markets is 
extremely sparse. What little information  is available in the literature until now is 
presented below. Following that is a description of the landowner survey used in the 
present study. This survey was designed with the intention of gaining a better 
understanding of Massachusetts landowner attitudes toward participation in carbon 
markets. 
3.1 The Literature 
There is very little information available about the likelihood that NIPF 
landowners will participate in IFM offset markets. To the author’s knowledge, there is 
only one study that investigates the topic quantitatively. The available literature is 
summarized below. 
Cason, et al. (2006) promote the use of university extensions in convincing and 
helping NIPF landowners to participate carbon sequestration programs in the American 
southeast. The authors present a qualitative discussion of carbon sequestration easement 
programs in Mississippi but do not provide a quantitative analysis of the likelihood of 
landowner participation.  
The only study at present to have explicitly analyzed the likelihood of NIPF 
landowner participation in carbon offset markets is a pilot study conducted by Fletcher, et 
al. (2009). The authors present IFM offset programs like the CCX aggregation programs 
detailed in chapter 2 to a focus group of Massachusetts landowners. Participants are 
asked to rate six programs each on a scale of 1 to 10, where a 10 represents absolute 
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certainly that the landowner will participate in the program. Program attribute variables 
include whether or not an official management plan must be filed, per acre annual 
revenue from the carbon offsets ($5, $15 and $30), time commitment (five or ten years) 
and whether or not there is a penalty for early withdrawal from the program.  
The authors use a tobit model to estimate the effect of program attributes on rating 
level and a logit model to estimate landowners’ willingness to sell carbon offsets. To 
render the ratings data usable for the logit model, the authors code a 1-8 rating as a “no” 
and a 9 or 10 rating as a “yes.” Socioeconomic variables were excluded from the final 
model due to insignificance of the parameter estimates. However, the authors caution that 
the insignificance is likely a result of such a limited sample size (only 17 landowners). 
They note that previous research demonstrates the importance of landowners’ 
characteristics in determining their responses to other types of management programs 
(Finley and Kittridge, 2006). 
Tobit results indicate that that landowners give higher ratings to programs that do 
not require a management plan, have higher revenue stream, and do not have an early 
withdrawal penalty. Surprisingly, a higher time commitment leads to a higher rating. 
there is no penalty for early withdrawal. 
Logit results suggest that only five percent of landowners would participate at an 
annual per acre payment of $15 where other attributes are held constant at their means. 
About 13 percent would take part in a program with a $30 per acre per year payment and 
33 percent would participate where the per acre annual revenue is $50. The authors note 
that at the current carbon price of $6 per ton on the CCX, an average Massachusetts 
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forest that sequesters one to three tons per year translates to an annual per acre revenue of 
$6 to $18.  
3.2 A Massachusetts Landowner Survey 
Massachusetts can and should play a role in climate mitigation; about 62% of its 
land is forested. Furthermore, 235,000 private individuals own 78% of that land (Alerich, 
2000). To assess the feasibility of a carbon sequestration program in this state, it is 
critical to understand how these landowners feel about enrolling their land in various 
hypothetical programs.   
To that end, the Family Forest Research Center recently conducted a mail survey 
of Massachusetts landowners with funding from the Massachusetts Agricultural 
Experiment Station and UMass Extension. An unusually high response rate of around 
50% was achieved (The Potential for Carbon Sequestration on Family Forest Land, 
2010). However, of the 1,403 returned surveys, only 910 were complete.  
Respondents answered questions about themselves and their land and then were 
asked to rate, on a scale of 1 to 10, three different hypothetical carbon sequestration 
programs. The rating question was worded such that a 10 should indicate absolute 
certainty on the part of the landowner that he or she would participate in the program 
given the opportunity, while a 1 should indicate absolute certainty of the opposite. Any 
rating in the middle should indicate varying levels of uncertainty on the part of the 
landowner. Prior to the rating questions, respondents were asked to read about a page of 
background information on CCX aggregator programs so they could understand what 
they were rating. This information is included in Appendix C. 
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The programs varied along the following lines: whether or not a management plan 
is required of the landowner, how long is the time commitment, what is the per-acre net 
revenue, and whether or not there is a penalty for early withdrawal from the program. 
These four attributes were used because they are representative of the parameters of 
involvement of the CCX aggregation programs and Chapter 61B described in chapter 2.   
There were four versions of the survey, each with a distinct set of three programs. 
Thus, there are 12 distinct programs with ratings data for each. The levels and attributes 
associated with each program are listed in table 1 below. This table is also in appendix A 
for reference. 
Table 1: Attributes and Levels for Each of the 12 Programs 
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 
Attr. P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 
Plan No no No no no no yes Yes yes yes Yes yes 
Time 5 10 10 5 5 10 5 10 10 5 5 10 
Rev. 15 5 30 5 30 15 15 5 30 5 30 15 
Pen. No no Yes no yes yes no Yes no yes No yes 
Plan: Management plan required?  
Time: Time commitment, in years. 
Rev.: Expected per-acre revenue, net of all costs ($) 
Pen.: Penalty for early withdrawal? 
 
A fractional factorial design was used to decide attribute levels for each program. 
Care was taken to avoid dominant or reverse-dominant programs that all respondents 
would likely rate 10 or 1, respectively. For example, a program with no required 
management plan, minimal time commitment, high revenue stream and no early 
withdrawal penalty would be a dominant program. A reverse-dominant program would 
include a required management plan, high time commitment, low revenue and a penalty 
for early withdrawal. Such universally popular or unpopular programs would not yield 
information about the tradeoffs landowners make when considering program attributes.  
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Individual characteristics obtained from the survey and used for analysis include 
acres owned, age, level of education and gender. Many more attitudinal questions were 
asked in the survey but are not included for this analysis. The characteristics used in this 
study and their associated variable names are listed in table 2 below and are also listed in 
appendix B. 
Table 2: Explanation of Variables Used 
Plan: Management plan required is a 1; not required is a 0. 
Time: Time commitment, in years. Takes on values of 5,10, and 15 years. 
Rev: Revenue net of costs, in dollars per acre per year. Takes on values of 5, 15, and 30 
dollars per acre per year. 
Pen: Penalty for early withdrawal is a 1; no penalty is a 0. 
Acre: Respondent owns 100 acres or more is a 1; fewer than 100 acres is  a 0. 
Older: Respondent is 66 years or older in age takes a 1; younger than 66 takes a 0. 
LowerEd: Respondent’s education level is high school diploma or less takes a 1; some 
college or more takes a 0. 
HigherEd: Respondent has more than a college degree is a 1;  
a college degree or less is a 0. 
Male: Respondent is male takes a 1; female takes a 0. 
Plan*Older: 1 if management plan is required and respondent is 66 years or older; else 0. 
Rev*Older: Revenue for respondents 66 and older. 
Plan*LowerEd: 1 if management plan is required and respondent has a high school 
diploma or less; else 0. 
Rev*LowerEd: Revenue for respondents with a high school diploma or less. 
Time*Male: Time commitment for males. 
 
In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate their age by checking one of 
five age categories. These were condensed into just two categories for the analysis. 
Similarly, there were five categories of education in the survey. These were condensed 
into three categories. The survey asked respondents to indicate how many acres they own 
with an open-ended question. Those numbers were converted to a dummy variable 
indicating more than 100 acres for the analysis.  
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3.3 Summary 
There is almost no literature on the likelihood that NIPF landowners will 
participate in carbon offset markets. The one study that explicitly investigates the topic is 
limited in scope; it is a pilot study of Massachusetts NIPF landowners. The study’s 
authors find low probabilities of Vermont and Massachusetts landowner participation in 
CCX aggregation programs. They conclude that landowners give lower ratings to 
programs that require them to file a management plan and have a penalty for early 
withdrawal. Landowners give higher ratings where revenue and time commitment are 
greater. Individual characteristics are insignificant as independent variables. These 
conclusions are tempered with the warning that they are based on a small, non-random 
sample. The present research is largely inspired and informed by that study. The mail 
survey of Massachusetts landowners conducted by the Family Forest Research Center is 
used to answer the question of how likely landowners are to participate in carbon 
sequestration programs.  
Econometric methodology for analyzing the survey data are detailed in the next 
chapter. Several possible discrete choice models are considered. The ordered and mixed 
ordered logit models are described in detail. Estimation pitfalls are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 The Most Common Choice Models 
There is a great number of possible discrete choice models available to the 
researcher. The models considered for this analysis are briefly outlined for the purpose of 
emphasizing a few of the many considerations the researcher has to make in choosing a 
model. Included in the discussion are the linear and tobit, multinomial logit, censored 
rank-ordered logit, binomial and binomial logit, and ordered and mixed ordered logit 
models. The ordered and mixed ordered logit are shown to comprise the best approach; as 
such, they are covered in detail. Estimation problems with the ordered models are 
discussed as well. 
4.1.1 Linear and Tobit 
The linear and tobit models were immediately discarded as possibilities. The 
ratings data are ordinal, but not interval. The difference between moving from a 2 to a 3 
does not necessarily have the same meaning as moving from a 9 to a 10. Interpretation of 
linear and tobit regression results is therefore not possible. Furthermore, probabilities of 
participation cannot be obtained (Borooah, 2002).  
4.1.2 The Multinomial Logit 
The multinomial logit (MNL) is based on random utility theory of consumer 
behavior. Choices made by a decision maker are modeled as follows. A decision maker 
with a vector of characteristics chooses from a set of discreet choices, each assigned a 
probability of selection. Each alternative comprises a vector of attributes.  
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Utility derived from a given alternative is assumed to be a linear function of two 
components, one deterministic one random. The deterministic component of utility is a 
function of individual characteristics and alternative attributes. The random component 
results from the researcher’s inability to observe all the attributes of the decision maker 
and not from actual random utility (Hensher, et al., 2000). This component is assumed to 
follow the logistic distribution. Thus, individual choice, described completely by varying 
levels of common attributes like socioeconomic background and a set of alternatives, is 
defined as a draw from a multinomial distribution with selection probabilities.  
Two major assumptions must be made to render the model operational. The first 
assumption is known as the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives Axiom, and posits 
that ratio of probabilities of choosing one alternative over another is unaffected by the 
presence or absence of other alternatives in the choice set.  There are tests to establish 
whether this is reasonable or not for a given study (Hensher, et al., 2000). The second 
assumption is that the choice set covers all relevant alternatives, so that respondents 
consider only the alternatives presented in the survey (DeShazo, et al., 2009).  
A MNL model is theoretically possible for use with this data set. To convert the 
program ratings into choice data, the highest rating of the three programs would be coded 
as a 1, indicating a “yes,” while the other two programs would be coded as zeros, or 
“no’s”. There are several critical flaws in this approach.  
As mentioned above, a basic assumption of the MNL is that the choice set facing 
respondents is complete. There is no exit option in the survey question. Respondents 
were not asked to rate the status quo as an alternative. Another major problem is that the 
highest rating might be a 2 or 3. To code that as a “yes” is not reasonable.  Even if it 
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were, there is a more practical concern. A substantial portion of respondents (30 percent) 
chose the same rating for all three programs. Those respondents would have to be 
trimmed from the model. 
A related model, the censored rank-ordered logit, is outlined by Layton and Lee 
(2006). This involves converting ratings into rankings. The authors point out that tied 
ratings do not necessarily indicate indifference, but might mean instead that the scale is 
not large enough. For example, an apparent tie on a Likert scale of 1-10 might disappear 
on a scale of 1-100 – a 9 versus 9 might become 92 versus 97. Thus ties are censored 
from the model. However, this approach is discarded because 30 percent of respondents 
rated their three programs the same and would have to be censored. 
4.1.3 The Binomial Logit 
A special case of the MNL is also considered – the binomial logit model. Each 
rating can be viewed as a choice between the status quo (doing nothing) and the program. 
Following Fletcher, et al. (2009), the ratings could be recoded to fit that type of choice. A 
slightly more conservative coding than that used by Fletcher, et al. involves coding a10 –  
indicating certainty of participation – as a yes (to the program). A 1-9 could be coded as a 
no. The no to the program is taken as a yes to the status quo.  
Each individual’s three ratings could be viewed as three binomial choices 
between the program and the status quo. However, there is no reasonable way to 
parameterize the status quo for each individual. The status quo could involve selling 
timber, enrolling in a conservation program, or just passively enjoying the land.  
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4.1.4 The Binary Logit 
The binary logit is more feasible. As with the binomial approach, a10 is coded as 
a 1 (yes) while a 1-9 is coded as a 0 (no). The probability of a yes is modeled without 
consideration of alternatives (Borooah, 2001). 
There is evidence that certainty on a Likert scale closely resembles an actual 
“yes” in the real world (Stevens, et al., 2000), yet the binary logit is not the best option. 
The data are ordinal in nature, not binary. Coding the data as mentioned entails ignoring 
any behavior in the 1 to 9 category and prevents analysis of the lower ratings. 
Furthermore, insignificance of important variables is likely because of the lack of 
variation in the binary-coded data. That happens with the binary coding of ratings data by 
Fletcher, et al. (2009). 
None of the models presented thus far are adequate for the data at hand. A more 
appropriate model, the ordered logit, accounts for the ordinal nature of the ratings data. 
This model is used in the final analysis and is detailed in the next section. 
4.2 The Ordered Logit : A Model Suited for Ratings Data 
The ordered logit model, also known as the cumulative logistic model, fits the 
dataset best. Note that the ordered probit model was discarded because of a paper by 
Kropoko (2008), who conducts a comprehensive set of simulations showing that the 
probit generally results in significantly more biased estimates than the logit. 
4.2.1 Model Setup 
The ordered logit is related to the latent class model. An unobserved (latent) 
dependent variable is a function of observed and unobserved variables: 
   ′  	 
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Note that r* is an unobserved, continuous, underlying tendency behind the observed 
ordinal response (rating). The X’s represent individual characteristics and program 
attributes, while the β’s represent the associated parameters. The error term captures 
stochastic (unobserved) variation. It is assumed to be distributed logistically.  
What we do observe is: 

  1     

  2       
… 

  10     
where R is the rating and the µ’s represent thresholds of y* that delineate the categories 
of the ordered response variable. These threshold parameters are restricted to be positive 
where each one is greater than the previous. The first parameter µ1 is normalized to 0 so 
that one less parameter has to be estimated. That is not a problem because the scale of the 
latent variable is arbitrary (Borooah, 2001).  
Thus the cumulative probability of choosing a particular rating or lower is found 
using the logistic cumulative density function 

    exp   ∑ 1  "#$  ∑ % 
which can be expressed more simply as 

    11  "#$   ∑ % 
Probabilities of lower ratings are subtracted from the cumulative probability of the rating 
of interest to find its probability of occurrence. This is shown below for the specific 
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rating values (Liao 1994). Note that F() is the logistic cumulative density function, 
defined above. 

  1  & '   ( 

  2  & '   (  & '   ( 

  3  & '*   (  & '   ( 
… 

  10  1  & '   (  
The likelihood of having observed the sample choices is therefore:  
+  ,
  1-./,
  2-.0 … ,
  10-./1 
where the N’s represent number of respondents in the sample who selected the 
corresponding rating. To obtain estimates for the regression coefficients and latent 
variable cutpoints, the log of the likelihood function 
++   N3  ln ,
  - 
is maximized with respect to the coefficients and cutpoints. 
4.2.2 How to Interpret an Ordered Logit Model 
There are three steps for interpreting the results of an ordered logit model. The 
first step (and least intuitive) is to look at the marginal effect of a change in X on the odds 
ratio 

  |
1  
  |  exp     
The coefficients in the regression results represent the marginal effect of a change in X 
on the log-odds. The effect on the odds ratio (given that the other independent variables 
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are held constant at their means and/or modes) is obtained simply by exponentiating the 
parameter estimate. Thus, the exponentiated coefficient is the effect that a one unit 
increase in the independent variable has on the odds ratio of the individual choosing one 
rating over all the other ratings (Liao 1994).  
A more sensible interpretation of the regression output involves predicting the 
probabilities for each category of the dependent variable at the means of the independent 
variables. To get those probabilities, all that is necessary is to plug the coefficients and X 
means into the equations below: 
 

  1  & '  ( 

  2  & '   (  & '  ( 

  3  & '*   (  & '   ( 
… 

  10  1  & '   (  
A finer analysis of the predicted probabilities is possible. Probabilities for each 
category at each level of a particular independent variable can be predicted. The other 
independent variables will of course be held at their means.  
Additionally, estimated marginal effects of independent variables on the 
probabilities of being in each category can be calculated. Differentiating the above set of 
equations with respect to xk yields 
7
  
7  ,&     &8   -  
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With dummy variables, this differentiation method will lead to biased results. A better 
way to get the marginal effect for a dummy variable is to calculate the probabilities for 
each category at X=0 and at X=1, and take the difference. While the bias will not be 
substantial enough to effect broad conclusions, it will mire a finer analysis (Liao 1994).  
4.3 Possible Problems with the Standard Ordered Logit 
Though the ordered logit model is much better suited for ratings data than the 
models listed in the first section, it is not totally ideal. There are still potential sources of 
bias and other estimation problems. These are described in the sections below. 
4.3.1 Choice Task Complexity and Protest 
Though the ordered logit is considered the best possible model for this dataset, 
several caveats must be offered before estimation. There is ample research indicating that 
choice complexity and protest attitudes can affect consistency of regression results.  
Moon (2004) shows that higher choice complexity leads to a higher likelihood of 
choosing the status quo alternative, suggesting that respondents choose the status quo 
because it is easiest to understand. For the survey in the present study, that problem 
would likely manifest itself in lower ratings among people who have difficulty 
understanding the programs. Adamowicz, von Haefen and Massey (2005) deal with serial 
nonparticipation – protest against the tradeoffs presented or suggested in the survey, or 
against all government action. These authors suggest that protest attitudes in the 
respondents can bias results because the choice selections are not sincere.  
DeShazo and Fermo (2002) develop five measures of choice task complexity in 
determining whether it is a problem with respect to consistency of estimation results. 
They too find a serious complexity effect, but offer a couple of solutions to deal with it. 
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They suggest that there are two stages in the experimental process where researchers can 
intervene to mitigate the complexity effect. First, researchers should choose the optimal 
number (identified via pre-testing) of alternatives, being careful about attribute 
correlation structures. Second, researchers can deal with complexity issues using a 
heteroskedastic logit model at the estimation stage (this requires non-constant complexity 
throughout sample).  
Of the 1,403 completed surveys in the present study, 493 did not contain any 
ratings data for the programs – respondents simply left that section blank. If the reason 
was choice task complexity or protest attitudes, there is a possibility of bias in using only 
the 910 completed surveys. The bias mitigation measures detailed in this section are 
unfortunately not possible for this study as the survey is already completed.  
4.3.2 Hypothetical Bias 
Hypothetical bias is a well-documented problem in stated preference studies. 
Participants often overstate willingness to pay for goods in the absence of a real-world 
budget constraint (Brown, et al., 2003). The problem of course can manifest itself in 
hypothetical willingness to accept as well. The present study includes willingness to 
accept measures in the per acre annual revenue variable. If NIPF landowners’ choices in 
the survey differ from what their choices would be in the real world because of the 
hypothetical nature of the revenue variable, estimates of the effect of per acre annual 
revenue will be biased. 
Murphy, et al., (2005) conduct a meta analysis of stated preference studies – that 
elicit both hypothetical and real willingness to pay – in order to determine the magnitude 
of hypothetical bias and its underlying causes. They find an average ratio of hypothetical 
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to real values of 2.35 and a median of only 1.35. The ten highest ratios averaged 10.3, 
indicating an extreme right skew. Thus hypothetical bias may not be such a serious 
problem in many studies.  
Murphy, el al. investigate the factors behind hypothetical bias using a log-log 
model with natural log of actual value as the dependent variable. On the right hand side 
are natural log of hypothetical value and square of hypothetical value, along with several 
dummy variables.  The authors conclude that greater bias results from higher stated 
hypothetical values, and that the relationship is positively quadratic. They determine that 
conducting studies using students and in group settings leads to greater hypothetical bias, 
but the student effect could not be extracted from the group effect.  
The last significant result of these authors’ work is that studies employing 
dichotomous/polychotomous choice, referendum, payment card and conjoint choice 
elicitation methods yield lower hypothetical bias than pricing elicitation methods. Several 
other variables, including whether a private good is involved, whether the comparison is 
within-group, and whether a calibration technique such as budget reminders or “cheap 
talk” is used, are included in the model. However, the significance of these factors 
depends on model specification. The authors recommend against focusing on these 
individually, though as a whole they explain a significant portion of variation between 
studies (Murphy, et al, 2005).  
There is evidence that asking (but not requiring) participants to sign an oath to 
respond honestly substantially reduces hypothetical bias in stated preference studies. 
Economic literature is sparse in the area of oath-taking. Shogren, et al. (2009), use 
psychology literature to inform their exploration of preference elicitation under oath. 
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Commitment theory in psychology suggests that the strongest commitments are freely 
made (under no pressure), publicly expressed and with consequences. The oath used in 
these experiments could not be made publicly or have serious consequences if broken. 
However, the participants were allowed to participate and given any monetary incentives 
regardless of whether or not they signed the oath.  
Shogren, et al. (2009) conduct four treatments each of an induced value and a 
homegrown auction. The four treatments consist of a baseline with no monetary 
incentives and no oath, the baseline with an oath, an auction with monetary incentives but 
no oath, and an auction with monetary incentives and an oath. In the induced value 
experiments, the authors find that without the oath there is a significant difference 
between bidding behavior and perfect demand revelation, regardless of the monetary 
incentive. The bidding behavior under oath with a monetary incentive is also insincere. 
Bidding behavior under oath with no monetary incentive, however, matches perfect 
demand revelation. The authors discover similar results in the homegrown auctions – the 
oath seems to keep people from overstating high bids and understating low bids.  
Though hypothetical bias is always a concern in stated preference studies, there is 
no reason to believe that the present study suffers from serious bias. The meta-analysis 
mentioned above indicates the hypothetical bias is usually quite low. In addition, a 
polychotomous choice/conjoint elicitation method was used and the willingness to accept 
numbers – in the form of revenue – are small. Unfortunately, an oath could not be used in 
the present study and the survey used does not include any measures to deal with choice 
task complexity or protest attitudes. 
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4.3.3 The Proportional odds Assumption 
A critical issue peculiar to the ordered logit model is the proportional odds 
assumption. An assumption behind the basic ordered logit model is that the effect of the 
regressors (except the intercept) is the same for all ratings. SAS provides a Chi-Square 
test of this assumption (Liao, 1994). However, this test is sensitive to large sample sizes 
(Long & Freese, 2001). 
4.3.4 The Repeated Choice Problem: Correlated Error Structure 
Another potential problem with using the basic ordered logit model is the repeated 
choice nature of this data set. Each individual chose a rating for each of the three 
programs presented. In that sense, the data can be viewed as having a panel structure with 
cross-sections (individuals) and time-series (three ratings). The three ratings are not truly 
time series because they were presented side by side on the same page, leaving 
respondents the option to review all programs before deciding on ratings. Yet the 
problem is mathematically identical.  
The ordered logit model treats an individual’s three ratings as three separate 
choices made by identical triplets, not as three choices made by one person. Yet decisions 
are likely correlated among individuals across the three choices. If that correlation can be 
fully explained by variation in observed independent variables then there is no problem. 
However, if there is unobservable correlation then the error structure is no longer in 
accordance with model assumptions. Regression results will be inconsistent (Train, 
2009). 
4.4 Possible Solution for the Proportional odds and Repeated Choice Problems:  
The Mixed Ordered Logit 
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A mixed ordered logistic model can be used to deal with correlated errors. Unlike 
the standard logit, mixed logit estimation allows for random taste variation among 
respondents, unrestricted substitution patterns, and correlation among random terms over 
time (Train 2009).  
The model setup is similar to the basic ordered logit, only the random coefficients 
are drawn from a nondegenerate mixing distribution rather than fixed. There are several 
ways of representing the model. Hedeker (2006) is followed here in that regard. The 
conditional probability of an individual i choosing a particular rating in time period j is  
+9  11  exp$9  :9;<9;% 
+9  11  exp ' $  9  :9;<9;%(
 11  exp$9  :9;<9;% 
+9*  11  exp ' $*  9  :9;<9;%(
 11  exp$   9  :9;<9;% 
… 
+9=  1  11  exp$   9  :9;<9;% 
where   1,2, … , ? with N being sample size,   1,2,3 refers to the choice number, 
k is number of fixed coefficients, and r is number of random coefficients. Thus xijk is a N 
x k matrix of independent variables, βk is a k x 1 vector of fixed coefficients, zijr is a N x r 
matrix of independent variables, and vir is a r x 1 vector of random coefficients. 
The mixing distribution governing the behavior of the random coefficients, vir , is 
frequently assumed to be a multivariate normal distribution of r dimensions, with mean 
vector b and covariance matrix W (Train 2009). In order to obtain those probabilities, 
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estimates of b and W must be obtained as well as of β and µ. The unconditional 
probability of individual i choosing rating c in time period j is the integral of the 
conditional probability times the mixing distribution evaluated over all possible values of 
the random coefficients: 
9@  A +9@, <9;  B<9;|C, DE<9; 
This is of course not a closed form expression.  
In order to overcome that obstacle, simulation is conducted. A random draw is 
taken from the multivariate standard normal distribution for each of an individual’s three 
choices. Each draw is “unstandardized” using the unknown b and W. The resulting vir’s 
are plugged into  
+9  11  exp$9  :9;<9;% 
+9  11  exp ' $  9  :9;<9;%(
 11  exp$9  :9;<9;% 
+9*  11  exp ' $*  9  :9;<9;%(
 11  exp$   9  :9;<9;% 
… 
+9=  1  11  exp$   9  :9;<9;% 
to get simulated conditional probabilities for each individual’s ratings for choices 1-3. 
The conditional probability of all three ratings from individual i is obtained by 
multiplying the simulated probabilities above: 
F9  G G+9@;HIJ
=
@K
*
K
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where rijc = 1 if individual i chooses rating c in time period j and 0 otherwise. For each 
individual, that whole process is repeated, perhaps 1,000 times. The average of the 1,000 
simulated conditional probabilities across time associated with each individual is taken as 
the simulated closed-form solution to the previous open-form unconditional probability 
expression: 
#9  1L  ,G G$+9@%
;HIJ
=
@K
*
K
-
,===
MK
 
Finally, the simulated log likelihood function is then: 
N++   ln#9
.
9K
 
This function is maximized with respect to β,µ, b and W to yield estimates for the mixed 
ordered logit model with repeated choices.  
 To obtain probabilities for each rating given average values of the independent 
variables, the average values b are used in place of vir. The same techniques can then be 
applied as with the standard ordered logit to get average marginal effects of changes in 
independent variables on the probability of choosing a rating.  
In theory, the mixed ordered logit model will be ideal for analyzing this survey 
data. It has none of the limitations of the multinomial, binomial or binary logit models. It 
is not limited by the proportional odds assumption of the standard ordered logit and 
allows for intra-person correlation among rating choices. The only issues it does not 
account for include choice task complexity and protest attitudes. However, the mixed 
ordered logit model is not used in the final analysis for reasons that will be made clear in 
chapter 5. 
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4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, several possible discrete choice models are considered for analysis 
of the survey ratings data. The ordered logit is the best candidate among the non-mixed 
models. Hypothetical bias is always a potential problem with stated choice data but is not 
viewed as a serious issue for the present study. The ordered logit model does have 
estimation pitfalls. It does not account for choice task complexity, protest attitudes, or the 
repeated choice nature of the data set. If the proportional odds assumption behind the 
ordered logit is unreasonable, results will be biased; yet assessment of the assumption’s 
validity is difficult because the test is sensitive to large sample sizes. The mixed ordered 
logit would solve all of those problems except for choice task complexity and protest 
attitude biases. This model will not be used in the final analysis, however, for reasons 
enumerated in the next chapter.  
In chapter 5, the survey data are analyzed using the standard ordered logit model. 
Estimation of the mixed ordered logit is attempted but fails. Odds ratio effects, 
probabilities for each rating by program, and partial effects are presented.   
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Programs at a Glance 
A descriptive analysis of the data shows a tri-modal or bi-modal distribution of 
ratings for each program. The bulk of respondents seem to rate programs at a 1, 5, or 10. 
Figures 1-12 below show the distribution of responses for each program presented in the 
survey. The attributes for each program are detailed in Appendix B. 
Figure 1: Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 1 Programs 
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Figure 2:Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 2 Programs 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 3 Programs 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 4 Programs 
 
The popularity of a particular program can be roughly assessed at a glance by 
noting whether category 1 or category 10 has a higher frequency of ratings. Table 3 
below provides additional information on respondents’ ratings by program. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Ratings by Program 
Rating Statistic 
  
Program 
Number Average Median Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
Survey 
1 
1 5.8 5 5 3.1 
2 4.1 4 1 2.8 
3 5.6 6 1 3.5 
Survey 
2 
1 4.9 5 1 3.3 
2 6.6 8 10 3.4 
3 4.4 5 1 3.0 
Survey 
3 
1 5.0 5 1 3.1 
2 3.0 2 1 2.5 
3 6.1 7 10 3.6 
Survey 
4 
1 3.1 2 1 2.5 
2 6.1 7 10 3.6 
3 4.1 4 1 3.0 
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Program 2 in survey version 3 appears remarkably unpopular. Other seemingly 
unpopular programs include numbers 1 and 3 in survey version 4. Program 2 of survey 
version 4 is notably popular. Respondents seem to feel relatively positive about programs 
2 and 3 of survey versions 2 and 3, respectively. Respondents appear less unified in their 
attitudes toward remaining programs. Probabilities for landowner participation are 
expected to follow these observations. 
5.2 Individual Characteristics 
The Family Forest Research Center achieved a high response rate to the mail 
survey of around 50 percent. However of those 1,403 respondents who returned surveys, 
only 910 rated the three programs. There were no follow-up questions to assess whether 
these resulted from protest attitudes or choice task complexity issues. However, the 
potential for bias is estimated by comparing characteristics of those respondents who 
rated the three programs to all respondents generally. If the group that rated the programs 
is significantly different from the group as a whole in terms of independent variables used 
in the ordered logit analysis then protest attitudes, choice task complexity, and/or sample 
selection bias is present. 
Table 4 below shows proportions of respondents with particular individual 
characteristics for the group that rated all three programs and for all survey respondents 
as a whole. The table also gives the probability value associated with a two-tailed Z test 
of the difference between the two proportions. 
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Table 4: Differences in Characteristic Proportions Between All Received Surveys 
and Only Surveys with Three Program Ratings 
  Acre Older LowerEd HigherEd Male 
Surveys with 
three ratings 
0.525 0.231 0.147 0.398 0.747 
All received 
surveys 0.545 0.292 0.168 0.359 0.736 
Difference -0.020 -0.061 -0.021 0.039 0.012 
P > |Z| 0.346 0.001 0.179 0.056 0.531 
  
The proportion of respondents with over 100 acres who rated all three programs is less 
than for all survey respondents. The same is true for respondents over the age of 65 and 
for those with a high school diploma or less. The proportion of respondents with more 
than a college degree and who are male is higher among those who rated all three 
programs compared to all survey respondents.  
The only significant differences between the program raters and all respondents as 
a whole, however, are with respect to age and higher education using a five percent level 
of significance. Significantly fewer people over the age of 65 rated the three programs 
while significantly more respondents with more than a college degree rated the three 
programs compared to all survey respondents. If difference in proportions with respect to 
respondents with a high school diploma or less is tested with a one-tailed test, the 
difference between program raters and respondents as a whole is significant at the ten 
percent level of significance. Significantly fewer respondents with a lower level of 
education  rated the three programs. 
It would not be far fetched to suppose that the proportion differences with respect 
to education level reflect choice task complexity issues. Aggregation for selling carbon 
offsets on the Chicago Climate Exchange is not a simple concept to convey to the 
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uninitiated (see Appendix C). There is no way to verify either choice task complexity or 
protest attitude problems; yet it is clear that these differences probably bias results of the 
ordered logit regression. The analysis proceeds having offered this caveat. 
5.2 Estimation Problems: The Mixed Ordered Logit 
Estimation of a mixed ordered logit model failed. An optimum could not be 
reached when maximizing the simulated log-likelihood function. To find an optimum, 
numerical integration is performed in as many dimensions as there are random 
coefficients in the model. That complexity combined with fact that there are 10 different 
category ratings appears to render the model intractable given the data set.  
5.3 Standard Ordered Logit Results 
An assessment of potential sources of bias mentioned in the previous chapter is 
conducted below. The repeated choice and proportional odds assumption problems are 
reconsidered. The stepwise procedure used to select indicator and interaction variables is 
shown. Ordered logit regression output and interpretation are then presented. 
5.3.1 The Repeated Choice Problem 
The standard ordered logit was ultimately used in place of the mixed model. 
Results are interpreted with the precaution that there is the potential for bias because the 
model does not account for correlation of individual choices across time. Results are 
robust in so far as any intra-person correlation is successfully explained by variation in 
program attributes.  
5.3.2 The Proportional Odds Problem 
An additional precaution is that the proportional odds assumption appears to be 
violated. The associated Chi-Square test compares the likelihood ratio of the standard 
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ordered logit to that of a nonproportional odds model (a multinomial logit). The test 
statistic is highly significant at 112 degrees of freedom; however, the test is sensitive to 
large sample sizes. Furthermore, the only alternatives are not reasonable. One is to run a 
binary logit for each of the 10 ratings and estimate different sets of coefficients for each 
rating. Around 140 parameters would have to be estimated. That approach is inefficient 
and is not considered. The other alternative is to conduct a multinomial logit analysis 
wherein each rating is treated as a non-ordinal choice. This approach ignores the ordinal 
nature of the ratings data. The ordered logit analysis continues having offered these 
caveats. 
5.3.3 Indicators and Interactions: A Stepwise Procedure 
A stepwise procedure was used with the ordered logit to determine which 
individual characteristic and interaction variables to include in the final model. The base 
model included just the management plan requirement indicator, time commitment, per-
acre revenue, and early withdrawal penalty indicator. Using a series of likelihood ratio 
tests, characteristics and interactions were added and accepted or rejected one by one.  
The effect of the continuous variable, acres owned, was rejected while a dummy 
variable indicating that the respondent owns 100 acres or more was included. Age was 
broken into three categories: 66 and older, 51-65 and 50 or younger. Only the 66 and 
older indicator was retained. A gender dummy indicating male was included. Level of 
education was split into three categories: a high school diploma or less, some college or a 
college degree, and beyond a college degree. With the middle category represented by the 
intercept, both the lower and higher education indicators were included in the model.  
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All possible interactions were considered. Only five remained after likelihood 
ratio testing. These include management plan with older than 65; revenue with older than 
65; management plan with lower education; revenue with lower education; and time 
commitment with male. 
5.3.4 Regression Results 
Regression results show that every rating level is significant. That suggests that 
each cutpoint is statistically important and cannot be viewed as measurement error. 
Results of the regression are included in table 5 below: 
Table 5: Ordered Logit Results 
Parameter Estimate Odds Ratio 
Chi-
Square Pr>ChiSq 
Cutpoint 1 -1.047 0.35 19.688 <.0001 
Cutpoint 2 -0.769 0.46 10.673 0.001 
Cutpoint 3 -0.534 0.59 5.159 0.023 
Cutpoint 4 -0.384 0.68 2.664 0.103 
Cutpoint 5 0.416 1.52 3.133 0.077 
Cutpoint 6 0.639 1.89 7.376 0.007 
Cutpoint 7 0.970 2.64 16.930 <.0001 
Cutpoint 8 1.557 4.74 43.045 <.0001 
Cutpoint 9 1.875 6.52 61.765 <.0001 
Plan -0.215 0.81 6.790 0.009 
Time -0.086 0.92 9.583 0.002 
Rev 0.060 1.06 214.468 <.0001 
Pen -0.419 0.66 32.859 <.0001 
Acre 0.121 1.13 3.050 0.081 
Older -0.090 0.91 0.252 0.615 
LowerEd -0.122 0.89 0.316 0.574 
HigherEd 0.431 1.54 32.873 <.0001 
Male -0.636 0.53 6.428 0.011 
Plan*Older -0.348 0.71 4.451 0.035 
Rev*Older -0.025 0.98 9.926 0.002 
Plan*LowerEd -0.384 0.68 3.665 0.056 
Rev*LowerEd -0.018 0.98 3.580 0.059 
Time*Male 0.059 1.06 3.507 0.061 
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All attribute and characteristic coefficients are significant except for the age (66 
or older) and education (high school diploma or less) indicators. All estimates have the 
expected signs. The odds of choosing a higher rating are lower by a factor of 0.81 where 
a management plan is required, by a factor of 0.92 with an additional year of time 
commitment, and by 0.66 where there is an early withdrawal penalty. Odds of a higher 
rating decrease by a factor of 0.91where the respondent is 66 or older, by 0.89 for the 
lower education level and by 0.53 where the respondent is male. The odds decrease even 
more where a management plan is required for older (by a factor of 0.71) and less 
educated respondents (0.68). Odds decrease less at higher time commitments for males 
than for females. The odds decrease less by a factor of 1.06 for an extra year where the 
respondent is male. A higher per-acre annual revenue increases odds of a higher rating 
less by a factor of 0.98 for older and also by 0.98 for less educated respondents than for 
others, though odds do increase for those two groups with increased revenue. Odds of a 
higher rating increase with higher per-acre revenue generally (by a factor of 1.06 for a $1 
per acre per year increase) and when the respondent is from the higher education category 
(1.54) and owns 100 acres or more (1.13).  
5.4 Binary Logit: A Comparison 
It is clear from the significance of the cutpoints in the ordered logit model that the 
binary logit, which codes 1-9 as 0 and 10 as 1, misses a great deal of information. To 
further investigate the apparent problem with the binary model, regression results are 
included in table 6 below. 
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Table 6: Binary Logit Results 
Parameter Estimate 
Odds 
Ratio 
Chi-
Square Pr>ChiSq 
Intercept 2.411 11.145 43.293 <.0001 
Plan -0.342 0.710 5.440 0.020 
Time -0.068 0.934 2.437 0.119 
Rev 0.082 1.085 136.121 <.0001 
Pen -0.513 0.599 13.726 0.000 
Acre 0.113 1.120 0.955 0.329 
Older -0.135 0.874 0.146 0.703 
LowerEd -0.084 0.919 0.030 0.863 
HigherEd 0.329 1.390 7.358 0.007 
Male -0.216 0.806 0.305 0.581 
Plan*Older -0.497 0.608 2.810 0.094 
Rev*Older -0.014 0.986 0.938 0.333 
Plan*LowerEd -0.780 0.458 3.381 0.066 
Rev*LowerEd -0.008 0.992 0.144 0.705 
Time*Male 0.008 1.008 0.027 0.870 
 
Indeed, many of the coefficient estimates in the binary model are insignificant, though 
signs are identical and magnitudes at least comparable. The only significant coefficients 
are the intercept, management plan, revenue, penalty, age and the interactions between 
management plan and age and education. These results are consistent with expectations; 
the binary model ignores important information in the 1-9 ratings.  
In spite of the insignificance of many of the binary estimates, probabilities for a 
10 rating are expected to be close between the ordered and binary models. Table 7 below 
shows the probabilities of each rating associated with each of the 12 programs for the 
ordered model. At the bottom are the binary model probabilities.  
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Table 7: Probabilities of Ratings by Program for Ordered and Binary Models 
Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4 
  P2 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 
  Ordered Logit 
P(R=1) 0.190 0.396 0.181 0.299 0.126 0.353 0.225 0.553 0.152 0.446 0.105 0.403 
P(R=2) 0.046 0.068 0.045 0.061 0.034 0.066 0.052 0.067 0.039 0.069 0.029 0.068 
P(R=3) 0.045 0.059 0.044 0.056 0.034 0.058 0.049 0.054 0.039 0.058 0.030 0.059 
P(R=4) 0.031 0.037 0.031 0.037 0.025 0.038 0.034 0.032 0.028 0.036 0.022 0.037 
P(R=5) 0.190 0.179 0.188 0.195 0.165 0.188 0.196 0.136 0.178 0.167 0.151 0.177 
P(R=6) 0.055 0.041 0.056 0.049 0.054 0.044 0.054 0.027 0.055 0.036 0.051 0.040 
P(R=7) 0.079 0.052 0.080 0.065 0.082 0.057 0.075 0.033 0.082 0.045 0.081 0.051 
P(R=8) 0.122 0.067 0.125 0.090 0.141 0.077 0.111 0.041 0.134 0.058 0.145 0.066 
P(R=9) 0.053 0.026 0.055 0.036 0.067 0.030 0.047 0.015 0.061 0.021 0.072 0.025 
P(R=10) 0.187 0.076 0.196 0.112 0.272 0.090 0.157 0.042 0.230 0.063 0.315 0.074 
  Binary Logit 
P(Yes) 0.173 0.062 0.234 0.085 0.301 0.082 0.130 0.027 0.266 0.038 0.338 0.060 
% Dif. 2.705 3.222 4.083 2.764 3.253 3.283 2.609 3.528 3.687 3.072 3.024 3.243 
 
For both models, the probabilities are calculated with program attribute levels 
corresponding to the version and program number and individual characteristics 
corresponding to the sample  modes (they are all indicator variables). As expected, binary 
and ordered probabilities are close. They differ by no more than 4 percent. However, 
results of the ordered logit model give more information about ratings 1-9 and show 
nearly all coefficients to be significant, as indicated above. The ordered logit is used for 
the remainder of the analysis. 
The least popular program – that is, the program with the lowest probability of a 
rating for a 10 – among modal respondents is program 2 in survey version 3. That 
matches preliminary findings from the distribution of ratings presented above. This 
program requires a management plan, has a 10 year time commitment, offers only a $5 
per acre annual revenue, and includes a penalty for early withdrawal from the program. 
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The most popular program is the second in survey version 4. That program has a 
management plan,  a five year time commitment, a $30 per acre annual revenue, and no 
penalty for early withdrawal.  
5.5 Partial Effects 
Partial effects can be calculated for any combination of program attributes and 
individual characteristics. The conventional way to present partial effects is to use 
average or modal values for the independent variables. Below, two sets of partial effects 
are calculated. Both sets use modal individual characteristics, but the first uses average 
program attributes (averaged using the 12 programs from the survey). The second set 
uses more realistic program attributes that correspond to real CCX aggregator programs.  
Those attribute levels are as follows. A management plan is required. There is a 
15 year minimum time commitment. Expected revenue is $8 per acre annually. There is a 
penalty for early withdrawal. Results for average attributes are summarized in table 8 
below: 
Table 8: Partial Effects on Probability of a 10 Rating Using Average Program 
Attributes and Modal Individual Characteristics 
Variable Effect Variable Effect 
Plan -0.028 HigherEd 0.070 
Time -0.015 Male -0.010 
Rev 0.010 Plan*Older -0.093 
Pen -0.051 Rev*Older -0.003 
Acre 0.016 Plan*LowerEd -0.102 
Older -0.042 Rev*LowerEd -0.002 
LowerEd -0.052 Time*Male 0.010 
 
Results obtained using the more realistic attribute levels are summarized in table 9 below: 
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Table 9: Partial Effects on Probability of a 10 Rating Using CCX-Like Attributes 
and Modal Individual Characteristics 
Variable Effect Variable Effect 
Plan -0.011 HigherEd 0.025 
Time -0.004 Male -0.011 
Rev 0.003 Plan*Older -0.018 
Pen -0.024 Rev*Older -0.001 
Acre 0.005 Plan*LowerEd -0.023 
Older -0.005 Rev*LowerEd -0.001 
LowerEd -0.011 Time*Male 0.003 
 
Partial effects are universally smaller in magnitude when evaluated at more realistic 
program attribute levels. The cause is probably the relative unpopularity of the realistic 
attribute levels across all types of respondents. These partial effects give more useful 
information, since the program attribute levels in the other set of partial effects are 
unlikely. These effects are discussed below. 
The partial effects generally conform to expectations. Holding individual 
characteristics at their modes, eliminating the required management plan increases the 
probability of a 10 rating by 1.1 percent for people under the age of 66 who have some 
college or a college degree. Note that the effect shown in the table is negative to 
emphasize that landowners do not like the management plan. However, the effect is 
calculated by changing from a CCX-like program in which there is a required 
management plan, to a program that does not require one. Thus, the effect is described as 
positive. The same is true for the early withdrawal penalty effect. The management plan 
effect is 2.9 percent for older people with more than a high school diploma, 3.4 percent 
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for younger people with less education, and 5.2 percent for those who are both older and 
less educated.   
Taking off a year of time commitment from the 15 years increases the chance of a 
10 rating by 0.4 percent for females and by 0.3 percent for males. An extra dollar per acre 
annual return on top of the $8 yields a 0.3 percent increase in probability for younger 
people with at least some college education. That number is 0.2 percent both for older 
and for less educated respondents. For respondents who are both older and less educated, 
that number is 0.1 percent. 
Removing the penalty for early withdrawal makes respondents 2.4 percent more 
likely to give a 10 rating. Owning less than 100 acres makes people 0.5 percent less likely 
to choose a 10. Being over the age of 66 reduces the chance of a 10 by 0.5 percent. 
Having only a high school education or less means that chance is 1.1 percent lower. 
Having more education than a college degree leads to a 2.5 percent increase in the chance 
of a 10. Finally, being female leads to a 1.1 percent increase in that chance.  
The marginal effects calculated at modal individual characteristics and CCX-like 
program attributes show the policy maker how probabilities change with changes in 
attribute levels or individual characteristics when the most prevalent type of landowner is 
considered. A more useful set of marginal effects can be calculated using the modal 
characteristics of landowners who gave a 6-9 rating for any given program. These 
landowners are not completely certain that they would participate in the given program, 
but at least feel somewhat positive about the possibility of participation. The policy 
maker interested in enticing greater participation should focus on that group. An IFM 
program could be developed with the intention of appealing to the type of landowner that 
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feels at least a little positive about participating in any given IFM offset program. 
Marginal effects for program attributes are presented for this group in table 10 below. 
The modal respondent who gave a 6-9 rating is slightly different from the general 
modal survey respondent. The only difference is that the modal respondent with a 6-9 
rating has more than a college degree while the general modal respondent has more than 
a high school diploma but no more than a college degree. The modal respondent with a 6-
9 rating, like the general modal respondent, owns more than 100 acres, is 65 years or less 
in age, and is male. The marginal effects of program attributes using realistic CCX-like 
parameters are presented below in table 10.  The effects represent the change in 
probability of a 10 rating that results from removing the management plan requirement, 
decreasing the time commitment by a year, increasing the per acre annual revenue by $1, 
and removing the early withdrawal penalty. 
Table 10: Partial Effects on Probability of a 10 Rating Using Modal Characteristics 
of Respondents with 6-9 Ratings 
Variable Effect 
Plan -0.014 
Time -0.006 
Rev 0.005 
Pen -0.001 
 
The magnitudes of the effects of eliminating the management plan, subtracting a 
year of time commitment, and adding a dollar per acre per year of revenue are slightly 
larger for the modal respondent who gave a 6-9 rating than for the general modal 
respondent. The effect of eliminating the management plan is to increase the probability 
of a 10 rating by 1.4 percent. Subtracting a year of time commitment and adding a dollar 
of revenue increase that probability by 0.6 and 0.5 percent, respectively. That indicates 
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that the 6-9 modal respondent cares slightly more about those attributes than the general 
modal respondent. The opposite is true for the effect of eliminating the early withdrawal 
penalty; it is smaller in magnitude for the 6-9 respondent. The effect of removing the 
early withdrawal penalty is to increase the probability of a 10 rating by only 0.1 percent.  
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the ratings data are summarized with descriptive statistics. The 
standard ordered logit model is estimated with the caveat that the repeated choice and 
proportional odds assumption problems cannot be dealt with; the mixed ordered logit 
estimation failed. Ordered logit regression output and interpretation proceeds.  
In accordance with the findings of Fletcher, et al., the requirement of a 
management plan and an early withdrawal penalty lead to lower probabilities of a 10 
rating while higher revenue means a higher probability. In contrast to their findings, an 
extra year of time commitment appears to decrease the probability of a 10 rating. Also in 
contrast to the results of Fletcher, et al., several individual characteristics are significant, 
including acres owned, gender, age and level of education. This difference in findings is 
likely a result of the use of both a small sample size and the binary logit model in the 
previous study.  
In chapter 6, policy implications of the ordered logit results are presented. 
Lessons learned from the survey and its analysis are discussed. Recommendations for 
future research in this are made.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This chapter is intended to inform policy making in the area of carbon 
sequestration programs and to make recommendations for future researchers in this field. 
The section below shows how the policy maker faces a tradeoff in crafting an ideal 
carbon sequestration program. There is also a discussion of how the policy maker should 
consider the population of landowners of interest; the program can be targeted toward 
specific types of landowners. The second section covers lessons learned from 
implementing the landowner survey and from estimating the ordered logit model. Future 
research directions are suggested.  
6.1 Policy Implications 
The ordered logit results make clear that a policy maker interested in crafting a 
NIPF landowner-friendly carbon offset program faces a tradeoff between conflicting 
policy elements.  There are two major issues a policy maker will likely consider in 
crafting such a program. First, there are the usual carbon offset considerations including 
verifiability, additionality and permanence. These issues are not dealt with here, but 
rather left to the carbon scientists. Second, the policy maker must consider the likelihood 
that forest owners will participate in the program. That issue is the motivation behind this 
study. Yet the two sets of issues contradict one another; the most sound carbon 
sequestration program will be the least agreeable for the average family forest owner.  
6.1.1 Maximum Participation Versus Maximum Carbon Sequestration 
Based on the estimated partial effects of program attributes, the ideal program – in 
terms of garnering maximum landowner participation – would have no management plan 
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required, minimal time commitment, a high per-acre annual revenue stream, and no early 
withdrawal penalty. The Chapter 61B current tax use program closely resembles this type 
of program.  
Yet a management plan is required for participation in the CCX aggregators 
currently in existence. A minimum of 15 years’ time commitment is required. There is a 
penalty for early withdrawal. The reason for these conditions of involvement, of course, 
is that they help ensure that the carbon offsets created are verifiable, additional and 
permanent. Verifiability means it can be proven that the carbon offsets truly represent 
carbon sequestration. Additionality means the offsets are in addition to the carbon 
sequestration that would happen if there were no offsets. An offset is permanent if the 
sequestered carbon is taken out of the atmosphere forever. If no management plan is 
required of participants, there is no way to quantify the carbon sequestration that results 
from managing the land in a particular way. Offsets would probably not be verifiable and 
might not be additional or permanent. A very short time commitment would not result in 
permanent carbon offsets. The absence of an early withdrawal penalty in an offset 
program would mean there is no incentive to keep the carbon sequestered once payments 
are received by the landowner; permanence of the offset would be questionable.  
The CCX-type aggregation program conditions, combined with a reasonable 
expected revenue of $8 per acre per year, closely resemble the least popular programs 
presented to survey respondents. A Chapter 61B-type program resembles the most 
popular program rated by survey respondents. There is a fundamental tension between 
the ideal program in terms of landowner participation and a program that results in 
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verifiable, additional and permanent carbon offsets. The policy maker must balance these 
competing measures.  
6.1.2 The Population of Interest 
The policy maker should consider whether his or her population of interest 
resembles the modal values of individual characteristics included in this study. The 
modal respondent is a male below the age of 66, with some college or a college degree 
and who owns 100 acres or more. If the population of interest is highly educated females, 
the probability of rating a CCX-like program at a 10 is about 3.6 percent higher. If the 
population of interest consists of older males with only high school diplomas with less 
than 100 acres, the probability of a 10 rating is 4.2 percent lower.  
The policy maker may want to consider the type of population that gave 6-9 
ratings in the survey; that type of respondent feels positively if not certain about 
participation. The modal 6-9 rating respondent is the same as the general modal 
respondent except that he has more than a college degree. The probability of a 10 rating 
of a CCX-like program is higher for this group by about 2.5 percent than for the general 
modal respondent. The difference is much greater for a Chapter 61B-type program; the 6-
9 modal respondent’s probability of 10 rating is about 10 percent higher than for the 
general modal respondent. 
6.1.3 Subsidies 
Another consideration for the policy maker might be some form of subsidy to the 
prospective participant. For example, an agency that aggregates offsets for the CCX 
could absorb the early withdrawal penalties, eliminating that risk for the landowner. Or 
the agency might offer subsidies on top of the revenue earned in the offset market. A 
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policy maker might even consider operating a program outside the offset market, simply 
paying landowners to sequester carbon. In that case, there need be no required 
management plan, no early withdrawal penalty and flexible time commitment and 
revenue possibilities. That type of program would be similar to the Chapter 61B current 
tax use program. The following table shows the probabilities that the modal respondent 
would give a 10 rating for several different attribute combinations. 
Table 11: Probabilities of 10 Ratings for Modal Respondents at Different Program 
Attributed Levels 
Required 
Plan? 
Time 
Commitment Revenue Penalty? Probability 
yes 15 8 yes 0.050 
yes 15 8 no 0.074 
yes 15 30 yes 0.166 
yes 15 30 no 0.233 
no 5 5 yes 0.067 
no 5 5 no 0.098 
no 5 30 yes 0.244 
no 5 30 no 0.329 
 
The first program represents a CCX-like program. The second, third  and fourth 
programs show how a government agency might sweeten the deal for participants in a 
CCX-like program by absorbing any early withdrawal penalties and/or subsidizing the 
per-acre revenue. The basic CCX-like program with no penalty absorption or subsidy has 
a probability of a 10 rating of only 5 percent. That probability jumps to 23.3 percent with 
a $22 per acre per year subsidy (on top of the CCX-earned revenue) and penalty 
absorption.  
The last four rows show programs that an agency might consider outside the 
offset market, simply to persuade landowners to sequester carbon. The revenue in all four 
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programs represents a pure subsidy. This might be a Chapter 61B-like program explicitly 
designed for carbon sequestration.  
The probabilities depend largely on revenue. The first two Chapter 61B-like 
programs have probabilities of a 10 rating of 6.7 and 9.8 percent. They differ only in 
whether or not there is an early withdrawal penalty. The second and third Chapter 61B-
like programs are the same as the first two except that revenue is $30 instead of $5. Those 
probabilities are 24.4 and 32.9 percent, respectively.  
The program with the highest probability of a 10 rating is, not surprisingly, the 
one in which there is no required plan, five year time commitment, $30 per acre annual 
revenue and no early withdrawal penalty. This program has a 32.9 percent chance of a 10 
rating. Of course, the merits of such a program are questionable at best in terms the 
verifiability, additionality and permanence of its carbon sequestration. 
As mentioned above, the policy maker may wish to target the type of landowner 
who gave 6-9 ratings with its carbon sequestration program because that landowner feels 
somewhat positive about participation. Table 12 below shows the same set of 
probabilities of a 10 rating as in table 11, but calculated for the modal 6-9 rating 
respondent rather than for the general modal respondent.  
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Table 12: Probabilities of 10 Rating for Modal Respondents with 6-9 Ratings at 
Different Program Attribute Levels 
Required 
Plan? 
Time 
Commitment Revenue Penalty? Probability 
yes 15 8 yes 0.075 
yes 15 8 No 0.110 
yes 15 30 yes 0.235 
yes 15 30 No 0.318 
no 5 5 yes 0.099 
no 5 5 No 0.143 
no 5 30 yes 0.331 
no 5 30 No 0.430 
 
The probabilities are of course all much higher for the modal 6-9 rating 
respondent; that is because he has a higher level of education than the general modal 
respondent. Notably, this type of respondent is 2.5 percent more likely to give a 10 rating 
to a straight CCX-like program than the general modal respondent. The probability of 
giving a 10 rating for a CCX-like program in which a government agency has absorbed 
the early withdrawal penalty and subsidized $22 on top of the CCX-earned revenue is 
31.8 percent – about 9 percent higher than for the general modal respondent.  
The probability of a 10 rating for a Chapter 61B-like program is 9.9 percent 
where there is a penalty for early withdrawal and only a $5 per acre annual revenue. That 
is about 3 percent higher than for the general modal respondent. The highest probability 
of a 10 rating corresponds to the Chapter 61B-like program that has no early withdrawal 
penalty and a $30 subsidy. That probability is 43 percent – about 10 percent higher than 
for the general modal respondent.  
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6.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
Another set of conclusions to draw from this analysis consists of 
recommendations for future research in the field of landowner participation in carbon 
sequestration programs. Recommendations for survey format, including a discussion of 
the particular method of choice elicitation and how to deal with choice task complexity 
and protest issues, follow in the sections below. 
6.2.1 Choice Elicitation Method: Ratings Versus Direct Choice 
The format of the survey questions used in this study limited analysis of the data 
in some ways while enhancing the analysis in others. The panel structure of the rating 
choices cannot be modeled because a mixed ordered regression is intractable. The 
estimation results may consequently be somewhat biased. The ratings cannot reasonably 
be converted to ranking data for use in the censored rank-ordered multinomial logit 
model because too many observations would have to be cut. Nor can they be converted to 
choice data for use in an ordinary MNL model – there are too many tied ratings and there 
is no exit or status quo option.  
A basic MNL or nested logit model could be estimated if respondents were asked 
to choose between the three programs and an exit, or status quo, option. The repeated 
choice problem would disappear. The choice set would be complete. Estimation would be 
quite simple.  
However, there is an information cost to requiring respondents to make a direct 
choice. That method of elicitation does not allow for uncertainty on the part of the 
respondent. When respondents face the rating format, they can express uncertainty on the 
ordinal rating scale about whether they would participate or not while providing valuable 
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information about the effect of independent variables on attitudes toward programs. A 
likely effect of not allowing respondents to express uncertainty is to force unsure 
respondents to choose the status quo. Someone who might have given a rating in the 6-9 
range for each of the three programs would likely choose to participate in none of the 
programs with the direct choice format. A great deal of information would be lost. That 
would likely result in misleading insignificance of important independent variables. 
Thus, the researcher faces a serious tradeoff when deciding between  ratings and 
direct choice formats. Researchers in the field of discrete choice analysis should explore 
this tradeoff further. A survey could be conducted in which half of respondents face a 
rating  format while the other half faces a direct choice format. The first half would be 
analyzed with an ordered logit model. A multinomial logit or one of its variants would be 
used for the second half. Parameter estimates, probabilities and marginal effects could be 
compared across the two models. If the results are not significantly different then direct 
choice and ratings formats are equally valid.  
A significant difference between multinomial a ordered logit results would most 
likely manifest itself in lower probabilities of a yes and insignificant parameter estimates 
from the multinomial logit estimation. In that case it can be assumed that the direct 
choice format causes a serious loss of information. The ratings format and the ordered 
logit would give more accurate results because they account for uncertainty in responses. 
The only serious limitation of the ratings format lies in model estimation. If a 
mixed ordered logit model could be used, the proportional odds and repeated choice 
problems detailed in chapter 4 would disappear. The problem encountered in this study of 
not finding an optimum in maximizing the simulated log likelihood function should be 
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further investigated. There are numerous numerical integration techniques for 
maximizing simulated log likelihood functions in mixed models. Though it is beyond the 
scope of the present study, these techniques should all be explored to determine whether 
some work better with the ordered logit model.  
A solution that makes possible estimation of a mixed ordered logit for the type of 
data used in this study would comprise the best possible procedure for similar research 
endeavors. The ratings format could be used without worrying about the issues 
surrounding the standard ordered logit.  
6.2.2 Better Capturing of Choice Task Complexity and Protest Issues 
The offset programs are probably difficult to understand for many respondents. 
There is undoubtedly a choice task complexity problem with this survey. That problem 
could easily be assessed and accounted for with a survey design that includes varying 
choice task complexity, as detailed by DeShazo and Fermo (2002). A heteroskedastic 
logit model would be estimated to account for the choice task complexity.. 
There was also very likely a protest attitude problem in the survey. Many 
respondents sent the survey back with angry words about government intrusion, refusing 
to rate the programs or simply giving all three programs a 1 rating. That too can bias 
results and should be accounted for with follow-up questions in the survey.  
6.3 Summary 
A policy maker interested in crafting a carbon sequestration program for 
Massachusetts, either by aggregating landowners’ IFM offsets for the CCX or through 
pure subsidies as with a Chapter 61B-type program, faces an unfortunate tradeoff. He or 
she must balance the likelihood of landowner participation on one hand with verifiable, 
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additional and permanent carbon sequestration on the other. The most popular carbon 
sequestration programs are the least legitimate.  
The policy maker should consider what population to target in crafting the 
program. If he or she wants to target the most common type of landowner, there is one set 
of probabilities of a 10 rating corresponding to different types of programs. For this 
group, the least popular CCX-based program has a 5 percent chance of a 10 rating. The 
most popular Chapter 61B-based program has a 33 percent chance of a 10 rating.  
A better approach may be to target the type of respondent who feels positively, 
though perhaps not certain, about participation. For that group there is another set of 
probabilities of a 10 rating corresponding to different program types. The least popular 
program has a 7.5 percent chance of a 10 rating while the most popular one has a 43 
percent chance. 
The researcher in this field of landowner participation in carbon sequestration 
programs faces a tradeoff as well. The tradeoff is between the benefits of using rating 
versus direct choice formats in the landowner survey. At present there is no obvious best 
survey format. Future research will hopefully identify an optimal procedure or at least 
further elucidate the problem. However, there are known methods for dealing with choice 
task complexity and protest attitudes that can bias results. An ideal survey with respect to 
those issues would have non-constant choice task complexity across surveys and several 
follow-up questions to assess the extent of protest attitudes. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
Overwhelming scientific evidence indicates that global warming is a serious, 
human-caused threat. American owners of non-industrial private forests (NIPF) can help 
mitigate global warming by managing their forests in a way that maximizes carbon 
sequestration. There are domestic markets for the trade of carbon offsets that come from 
such improved forest management (IFM), including over the counter markets and the 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). Possible future opportunities for the Massachusetts 
NIPF owner to sell IFM offsets lie in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and a 
national cap and trade program outlined in the House and Senate versions of a new 
climate legislation.  
At the moment there are scant opportunities for the Massachusetts NIPF 
landowner to participate in IFM offset markets. This paper examines the willingness of 
Massachusetts landowners to participate in either private aggregation programs for the 
CCX or in government-sponsored programs like Chapter 61B to induce carbon 
sequestration. 
Using a recent landowner survey conducted by the Family Forest Research 
Center, an ordered logit model of respondents’ ratings of hypothetical programs is 
estimated. Results indicate that landowners are less likely to give a 10 rating to a program 
that requires a management plan to be filed, has a higher time commitment, and has an 
early withdrawal. Landowners are more likely to give a 10 rating to a program with 
higher per acre annual revenue. Male, lower educated and older landowners are less 
likely to give a 10 rating to any program. Younger females with a higher level of 
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education and who own more than 100 acres are more likely to give a 10 rating. Males 
are less concerned about higher time commitments than females, though the effect of a 
higher time commitment on probability of a 10 rating is negative for both. Lower 
educated and older respondents care less about the early withdrawal penalty and about 
revenue than other respondents.  
Results show that the probability that the average respondent would give a 10 
rating is very low – around five percent. Even those with more favorable demographics 
are not very likely to participate. That appears to be the result of low expected payment 
($8 annually per acre) and an aversion toward a required management plan, lengthy time 
commitment and early withdrawal penalty.  
To make landowner participation in IFM offset programs  in Massachusetts more 
likely, a policy maker would have to change some or all of the policy attributes currently 
facing prospective CCX aggregation program participants. The probability that an 
average respondent would participate in a totally landowner-friendly program is around 
33 percent. Such a program would have no required management plan, only a five year 
time commitment, a $30 per acre annual revenue and no early withdrawal penalty.  
However, if the policy maker’s goal is to maximize carbon sequestration, the deal 
should not be too sweet for landowners. Without a forestry management plan, serious 
time commitment and disincentive for quitting early, an IFM program would likely not 
result in verifiable, permanent or additional carbon sequestration.  
The policy maker should consider the target demographic for his or her carbon 
sequestration program. Rather than targeting the most common type of landowner, a 
better approach might be to target respondents that feel more positive about participating. 
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That demographic has a higher level of education than the general modal respondent. The 
probability of a 10 rating for the least popular, CCX-based program is 7.5 percent – 2.5 
percent higher than for the modal respondent. The chance of a 10 rating for the most 
popular, Chapter 61B-based program is 43 percent – 10 percent higher than for the modal 
respondent. 
Several recommendations can be made regarding future research of this type. 
There is no clearly optimal survey format with respect to ratings versus direct choice 
elicitation for this type of study. The advantage of using ratings is that uncertainty on the 
part of the respondent is allowed, which yields more information about the landowner 
attitudes than a direct choice format. However, there are estimation problems associated 
with ratings data. The advantage of using a direct choice format is that many more 
options for estimation are available with direct choice data. The problem is that 
information is likely lost by forcing respondents to make an absolute choice. Surveys 
similar to the one used in this study might include non-constant choice task complexity 
across surveys as well as follow-up questions to assess any protest attitude issues. 
Finally, possibilities for mixed ordered logit estimation should be investigated, such as 
alternative numerical integration techniques.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
PROGRAMS FROM THE SURVEY 
Attributes and Levels for Each of the 12 Programs 
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 
Attr. P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 
Plan No no no No no no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time 5 10 10 5 5 10 5 10 10 5 5 10 
Rev 15 5 30 5 30 15 15 5 30 5 30 15 
Pen No no yes No yes yes no yes no yes no yes 
Plan: Management plan required? A 0 indicates no. 
Time: Time commitment, in years. Takes on values of 5 and 10 years. 
Rev: Expected per-acre revenue, net of all costs ($). Takes on values of 5, 15 and 30 
dollars per acre per year. 
Pen: Penalty for early withdrawal? A 0 indicates no. 
 
Notes: each respondent rated three of the above programs, depending on which survey 
version he or she received. In total, 12 different programs were rated by different 
respondents. 
A fractional factorial design was used to decide the attribute levels for each program. 
There are no pure dominant or reverse-dominant programs administered in any of the 
survey versions.   
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APPENDIX B 
EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES USED 
 
Explanation of Variables Used 
Plan: Management plan required is a 1; not required is a 0. 
Time: Time commitment, in years. Takes on values of 5and 10 years. 
Rev: Revenue net of costs, in dollars per acre per year. Takes on values of 5, 15, and 30 
dollars per acre per year. 
Pen: Penalty for early withdrawal is a 1; no penalty is a 0. 
Acre: Respondent owns 100 acres or more is a 1; fewer than 100 acres is  a 0. 
Older: Respondent is 66 years or older in age takes a 1; younger than 66 takes a 0. 
LowerEd: Respondent’s education level is high school diploma or less takes a 1; some 
college or more takes a 0. 
HigherEd: Respondent has more than a college degree is a 1; a college degree or less is a 
0. 
Male: Respondent is male takes a 1; female takes a 0. 
Plan*Older: 1 if management plan is required and respondent is 66 years or older; else 0. 
Rev*Older: Revenue for respondents 66 and older. 
Plan*LowerEd: 1 if management plan is required and respondent has a high school 
diploma or less; else 0. 
Rev*LowerEd: Revenue for respondents with a high school diploma or less. 
Time*Male: Time commitment for males. 
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APPENDIX C 
CHOICE ELICITATION SECTION OF THE SURVEY 
Step 1: Please read the following description of the Michigan Working Forest Carbon 
Offset Program: 
 
Michigan Working Forest Carbon Offset Program 
Overview 
The goal of the Michigan Forest Carbon Offset Program (MFCOP) is to provide 
landowners with financial incentives to engage in sustainable forest management, address 
climate change, support local natural resource economies and preserve family lands. 
The Program allows landowners to generate revenue through the sale of carbon offset 
credits on the Chicago Climate Exchange. 
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCE) - a voluntary, member-based market comprised of 
large companies, municipalities and institutions - allows carbon sequestration benefits 
from conservation practices to be quantified, credited and sold. The credits are pooled 
from many different landowners and sold to CCE members who have made a 
commitment to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.  CCE members must reduce their 
emissions to meet legally binding targets or mitigate a portion of their emissions through 
the purchase of offset credits generated by eligible practices.  The Delta Institute, a non-
profit organization, pools and sells these credits on the CCE on behalf of the landowner.  
The revenue from the sale, minus pooling and trading fees, is returned to the landowner.   
Landowners who sustainably manage forestlands provide a valuable public service 
through carbon sequestration.  This rise of carbon credit trading has opened new financial 
markets for landowners.  However, the complexities and costs to enter these markets are 
often a barrier to participation.  The Michigan Working Forest Carbon Offset Program 
eliminates this barrier to entry, allowing landowners to earn revenue for providing a 
valuable ecosystem service. 
Step 2: Please rate the options using the instructions below: 
Please assume a similar forest carbon offset program will soon be developed in 
Massachusetts and complete the following. Please rate each of the following carbon 
offset programs on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being programs in which you would 
definitely enroll and 1 being programs in which you would definitely not enroll. Please 
look over all three of the alternatives before making your ratings. You may use any 
particular rating for more than one program if you feel equally about them. 
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 Carbon Credit Program 1 Carbon Credit Program 2 
Eligibility Requires management plan 
written by professional forester 
Requires management plan 
written by professional forester 
Time Commitment 5 years 5 years 
Verification Baseline carbon inventory 
calculated by forester; changes 
in carbon capacity must be 
reported annually 
Baseline carbon inventory 
calculated by forester; changes 
in carbon capacity must be 
reported annually 
Expected Payment $5/acre/year $30/acre/year 
Early Withdrawal 
Penalty 
$10/acre one time payment None 
 Rating (1 to 10 scale):______ Rating (1 to 10 scale):_____ 
 
 Carbon Credit Program 3 
Eligibility Requires management plan written by professional 
forester 
Time Commitment 10 years 
Verification Baseline carbon inventory calculated by forester; 
changes in carbon capacity must be reported annually 
Expected Payment $15/acre/year 
Early Withdrawal Penalty $10/acre one time payment 
 Rating (1 to 10 scale):______ 
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